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EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC 
CRISES IN THE BRAZILIAN CAPITAL MARKET
Gerenciamento de resultados e crises econômicas no mercado de capitais brasileiro
Gestión de resultados y crisis económica en lo mercado de capitales brasileño
ABSTRACT
The 2008 economic crisis challenged accounting, either demanding recognition and measurement 
criteria well adjusted to this scenario or even questioning its ability to inform appropriately entities’ 
financial situation before the crisis occurred. So, our purpose was to verify if during economic crises 
listed companies in the Brazilian capital market tended to adopt earnings management (EM) practic-
es. Our sample consisted in 3,772 firm-years observations, in 13 years – 1997 to 2009. We developed 
regression models considering discretionary accruals as EM proxy (dependent variable), crisis as a 
macroeconomic factor (dummy variable of interest), ROA, market-to-book, size, leverage, foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) and sector as control variables. Different for previous EM studies two approach-
es were used in data panel regression models and multiple crises were observed simultaneously. 
Statistics tests revealed a significant relation between economic crisis and EM practices concerning 
listed companies in Brazil in both approaches used.
KEY WORDS |  Earnings management, macroeconomic factors, economic crises, emerging capital 
markets, Brazil.
RESUMO
A crise econômica de 2008 desafiou a contabilidade, demandando critérios de reconhecimento e men-
suração ajustados a esse cenário, ou mesmo questionando a sua capacidade de informar adequada-
mente a situação econômico-financeira das entidades antes de sua ocorrência. Nesse trabalho verifi-
camos se durante crises econômicas as empresas listadas no mercado de capitais brasileiro tendiam a 
adotar práticas de gerenciamento de resultados (GR). A amostra consistiu de 3.772 observações empre-
sas por ano, de 1997 a 2009. Desenvolvemos modelos de regressão com dados em painel, consideran-
do accruals discricionários como uma proxy de GR, crise como um fator macroeconômico (variável de 
interesse), e ROA, market-to-book, tamanho, alavancagem, investimento estrangeiro direto e setor como 
variáveis de controle. Diferentemente de estudos anteriores sobre GR, duas abordagens foram utilizadas 
na construção dos modelos e múltiplas crises foram observadas simultaneamente. Os testes estatísticos 
revelaram, em ambas as abordagens, uma relação significativa entre crise e as práticas de GR.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE | Gerenciamento de resultados, fatores macroeconômicos, crises econômicas, mer-
cado de capitais emergente, Brasil.
RESUMEN
La crisis económica de 2008 ha desafiado a la contabilidad, exigiendo criterios de reconocimiento y 
evaluación apropiadamente ajustados a ese escenario, o incluso cuestionando su capacidad de in-
formar adecuadamente sobre la situación económico-financiera de las entidades antes del comienzo 
de la crisis. Nuestro objetivo ha sido comprobar si durante las crisis económicas las empresas que 
cotizan en el mercado de capitales brasileño se inclinan a adoptar prácticas de gestión de resultados 
(GR). La muestra está formada por 3.772 observaciones por empresa/año, durante 13 años (de 1997 a 
2009). Desarrollamos modelos de regresión, considerando los ajustes discrecionales (discretionary 
accruals) como proxy de GR (variable dependiente), la crisis como un factor macroeconómico (variable 
de interés), ROA, market-to-book, tamaño, impulso, inversión extranjera directa y sector como varia-
bles de control. Al contrario de los estudios anteriores sobre gestión de resultados, se han utilizado 
dos enfoques en los modelos de regresión de datos en panel y se observaron distintos escenarios de 
crisis simultáneamente. Las pruebas estadísticas revelaron, en ambos enfoques utilizados, una rela-
ción significativa entre la crisis y las practicas de GR en las compañías presentes en Brasil.
PALABRAS CLAVE | Gestión de resultados, condiciones macroeconómicas, crisis económicas, merca-
dos de capital emergentes, Brasil.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 90s, the Brazilian economy, through a series of gov-
ernment measures, consolidated its pillars. The inflation con-
trol, currency stability, and GDP growth, among other factors, 
corroborated for the development and leverage of the Brazilian 
capital market.
The Brazilian Stock Exchange BM&FBovespa (formerly 
Bovespa) grew by 505% (from $255,478.0 million to $1,545,565.7 
million) in domestic market capitalization from 1997 to 2010, 
while the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE, USA) and Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE, Japan), the first and second in market capital-
ization in 1997 had, respectively, a 51% (from $8,879,630.6 mil-
lion to $13,394,081.8 million) and a 77% (from $2,160,584.8 
million to $3,827,774.2 million) increase over the same period. 
In December 2010, the BM&FBovespa reached the first position 
in Latin America, with a domestic market capitalization great-
er than the sum of the others (Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Chile, 
Bermuda and Mexico markets capitalization sum $1,173,438.1 
million) and 11th in the world (WFE, 2011).
With the expansion of this form of financing, accounting 
information for external users plays (or should play) a relevant 
role in reducing information asymmetry and thus make more ef-
ficient the present and future contracts.
Accounting practices for recognition, measurement and 
disclosure are sensitive to the environment in which they are 
applied, responding to stimuli arising from the legal systems, 
political and economic characteristics of users and preparers of 
financial statements, cultural values, and other sources.
  Derived from this relationship, it was observed that 
during (and even after) economic crises, accounting has been 
questioned either by its ability to use instruments capable of 
recognizing and timely measuring the impact of crisis in the fi-
nancial position of the entity and, whether by the omission (in-
tentional or not) of firms’ relevant information which could allow 
users to better investment evaluation (e.g. Barth & Landsman, 
2010; Hopwood, 2009; Arnold, 2009).
Managers’ opportunistic behaviour can affect negative-
ly the quality of accounting information disclosed for external 
users. When there is a legally permitted range for discretion 
in choosing the practices for recognition and measurement of 
accounting elements, managers could deliberately choose the 
most favourable to their interests at the expense of the one 
that would represent a closer representation of the econom-
ic event.
Earnings management is usually characterized as an op-
portunistic manager’s practice that aims to deceive the external 
user (non-controlling shareholders and stakeholders in gener-
al), using the permissibility in selecting accounting principles 
for recognition and measurement of elements (assets, liabili-
ties, and revenues and expenses) within the limits of the rules, 
in order to deliberately inform misleading results.
Endogenous and exogenous factors can motivate pos-
itive or negative EM practices. Among the internal factors are 
corporate governance framework and mechanisms (e.g. su-
pervisory board, audit committee, compensation policy, inter-
nal controls); organizational culture; internationalization; size; 
among others. Previous studies have also identified several 
exogenous factors that might affect the EM behavior, such as 
human and economic development, economic freedom (Ria-
hi-Belkaoui, 2004); legal system, including the rules and their 
enforcement (Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003); cultural values 
(Han, Kang, Salter, & Yoo, 2010) and; audit quality (Tendeloo & 
Vanstraelen, 2008).
It is expected in that context that economic crises affect 
the EM behavior. An economic crisis can either stimulate or in-
hibit EM practices, depending on the intended purpose. The 
economic crisis motivates the EM when, for example, it is used 
as an “excuse” to drop losses from bad past management prac-
tices, thereby obscuring the poor performance of the manag-
er that could lead to his dismissal; or even when to avoid any 
“political sanctions” (higher taxes, stricter regulation and su-
pervision, withdrawal of incentives), profits that would be sub-
stantially larger than those of other companies and/or sectors 
of the economy are purposely reduced to an “acceptable” level. 
In companies heavily dependent on the stock market, in turn, it 
could be a motivation for EM in the post-crisis period, seeking 
to present positive results and encourage the return or perma-
nence of the investor after a period of “bad news”.
On the other hand, the crisis might inhibit the EM, es-
pecially when accounting practices were perceived as facilita-
tors, as occurred in the post-Enron and subprime crises. For 
example, the recognition and measurement of revenues, de-
rivatives, provisions and related party transactions contribut-
ed to cover up the real financial position, giving more “breath” 
not only to those companies, but mainly ensuring the perma-
nence of their managers despite the poor performance. Con-
sequently, to regain market confidence and achieve stability, 
severe measures were taken, reducing the room for value judg-
ment on accounting choices, attributing greater responsibility 
to managers and boards, overseeing and punishing more rig-
orous undesirable behaviors, which leads to creating an unfa-
vorable environment to EM.
Thus, our main purpose was to verify if during econom-
ic crises listed companies in Brazilian Stock Exchange tended to 
adopt earnings management practices.270
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We justified, therefore, the present study by: a) social rel-
evance of economic crises and the need for research in account-
ing on the subject, b) lack of previous studies investigating the 
relationship between economic crises (macroeconomic factors) 
and earnings management with the approach proposed here 
(longitudinal data analysis allowing the simultaneous observa-
tion of multiple crises), c) differences in statistical treatment of 
data compared with previous studies of earnings management.
The paper is organized as follows: review of previous 
studies and hypothesis development (section 2); methodolog-
ical procedure description, including variables, models and 
sample (section 3); main results with corresponding statistical 
tests and analysis (section 4); and summary, conclusions and 
suggestions for future research (section 5).
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT
Earnings management (EM) can be understood as the use of (le-
gally allowed) discretion by managers in the selection practic-
es of recognition and measurement of accounting elements to 
deliberately manipulate earnings – to increase or decrease – 
depending on their interests (e.g. Healy, 1985, Sweeney, 1994, 
Jones, 1991, Dechow & Skinner, 2000, Healy & Wahlen, 1999).
Since incentives to earnings management practices derive 
mainly from the environment in which managers operate – capi-
tal markets, contracts and political or regulatory costs (Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978), it is expected that 
events affecting the environment, would change the conditions 
/ incentives for EM practices. This is the case of economic crises.
Several previous studies have addressed the relationship 
between accounting (standards and/or practices) and econom-
ic crises, either questioning the role of accounting on detect-
ing crises in advance (e.g. Barth & Landsman, 2010; Bezemer, 
2010; Arnold, 2009) or; investigating changes in accounting in-
formation quality, the explanatory power of earnings (e.g. Da-
vis-Friday & Gordon, 2005; Graham, King, and Bailes, 2000) and 
conservatism (e.g. Herrmann, Pornupatham, & Vichitsarawong, 
2008) during and after crises, or even the impact of regulations 
on financial crises (e.g. Masood, Aktan, & Pariente, 2010).
Some trends in research can be explained by specific 
characteristics of crises. The 2007-2008 crisis, for example, giv-
en its origin in the credit crisis and the profound social impact 
of the resulting recession, encouraged the questioning of ac-
counting role (e.g. Arnold, 2009; Hopwood, 2009), accounting 
predictive power (e.g. Bezemer, 2010), the adoption of fair val-
ue as measurement basis (e.g. Barth & Landsman, 2010; Boyer, 
2007) and the alleged improvement in the information quality 
with IFRS – International Financial Reporting Standards adop-
tion (Bhimani, 2008).
When questioning the role of accounting and its predictive 
power, the criticism usually ‘spill over’ academics and regula-
tors. In this sense, Bezemer (2010, p. 686) argues that there is a 
“discrepancy between official assessments and reality before and 
during the 2007–2008 credit crisis and ensuing recession […] the 
sense of surprise at the credit crisis among academics and poli-
cymakers, giving rise to the view that ‘no one saw this coming’”.
Currency crises originating from significant currency de-
valuation – as occurred in Mexico in 1994 (Davis-Friday & Gor-
don, 2005) and Thailand in 1997 (Graham, King, & Bailes, 2000) 
justify research about the relevance of accounting information. 
Previous research also addressed earnings management prac-
tices and economic crises. Like the other studies mentioned in 
this section, a crisis is usually chosen to analyze the relation-
ship with accounting practices.
In the oil crises that occurred in the Gulf in the 90s, Han 
and Wang (1998) observed that the political costs were the main 
incentive for the practice of EM, seeking an earnings reduction. 
Johl, Jubb, and Houghton (2003), as well as Choi, Kim and Lee 
(2011) focused on the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, but with differ-
ent approaches and scopes. Johl, Jubb, and Houghton (2003) 
evaluated the audit quality and the EM practices of firms list-
ed in Malaysia; while Choi, Kim and Lee (2011) extended their 
sample to other Asian countries and, after observing the EM be-
haviour of listed firms, sought explanations for the results in 
weakness/strength of institutions in the analyzed countries. 
These studies used discretionary accruals as EM proxies (dis-
cussed in section 3 of this paper).
A change is expected in EM behaviour in crisis period be-
cause, as noted earlier, the crisis would affect the incentives for 
managers – pertaining to market incentives, contracts and po-
litical or regulatory costs in this direction.
Considering the analysis of previous studies in this sec-
tion and, in particular, the results of the research by Han and 
Wang (1998) and Johl, Jubb, and Houghton (2003), which ob-
served changes in earnings management behaviour in the oil 
crises of the 90s and the Asian crisis of 1997, respectively, the 
following research hypotheses, corresponding to the two crises 
scenarios were proposed for test:
H1: There is a statistically significant difference in discretion-
ary accruals (used as proxies for earnings management be-
haviour) of companies listed in the Brazilian Stock Exchange 
in periods of economic crisis (1997-1999, 2003 and 2008) 
in relation to non-crisis (2000, 2002, 2004-2007) periods.271
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H2: There is a statistically significant difference in discretion-
ary accruals (used as proxies for earnings management be-
haviour) of companies listed in the Brazilian Stock Exchange 
in periods of economic crisis (1997-1999, 2002 and 2008) in 
relation to non-crisis (2000, 2003, 2004-2007) periods.
According to the theory of business cycles (e.g. Baner-
ji & Dua, 2011; Chauvet, 2002; Burns & Mitchell, 1946, Mitch-
ell, 1927), we considered that 1997, 1998, 1999, 2003 and 2008 
were years of crisis in the Brazilian economy. Consistently with 
this criterion, years in which the Brazilian economy moved away 
from its historical trend of growth were treated as ‘crisis year’.
It was also noticed, among the selected years, that 2003 
features distinguished it from the others, which can be ex-
plained by the earlier turbulence in 2002. In 2002, due to the 
expectation of opposition victory in presidential election (Lula 
– Luis Inácio Lula da Silva was the opposition candidate), fear 
of economic change and concerns about the ability (and will-
ingness) of the future government to honour its commitments 
largely affected the financial market. This led us to build a sec-
ond scenario replacing 2003 by 2002, in which there a situation 
closer to the other selected periods was found. The two scenar-
ios were included – as the ‘crisis’ variable – in the models and 
statistical tests.
The next section presents the models, variables, data 
collection and other methodological choices to test the pro-
posed hypotheses.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In this section, we present the methodological procedures for 
the development of the research. Initially we present the op-
erational definition of the variables, followed by the models of 
earnings management used and the sample selection.
Operational definition of variables
In order to develop our models and establish the sample selec-
tion criteria, we first defined the operational variables in three 
groups: dependent variable (earnings management), explana-
tory variables: interest (crisis) and control.
Earnings management proxies – dependent 
variable
Because the discretion in the choice of practices for recognition 
and measurement of accounting elements is almost always in-
cluded in the EM concept, most of the research on earnings man-
agement has been associated with accruals. The use of accruals 
is also justified as a proxy for the difficulty in practice to reliable 
classifying a practice (normally permitted under law) as EM.
The most common ways to identify EM practices through 
accruals are: (i) technique of frequency distributions (e.g. 
McNichols & Wilson, 1988), (ii) analysis of specific accruals (e.g. 
Petroni, 1992; Marquardt & Wiedman, 2004), (iii) models for ag-
gregate accruals.
In the technique of frequency distribution – the simplest 
of the three – an analysis of cross-sectional data is used to ob-
serve variations in the results considering a specific event (e.g. 
a regulatory change). The analysis of specific accumulations, 
in turn, has been employed to evaluate practices of EM in the 
recognition and measurement of specific items and restricted 
by sectors (e.g. claim loss reserves in insurance companies – 
Petroni, 1992).
The analysis of accruals aggregate seeks to identify the 
EM behaviour by obtaining the accruals totals and their sub-
sequent segregation between discretionary and nondiscre-
tionary, the latter considered a proxy of EM. For our study we 
chose the latter approach because: a) our sample covers 19 dif-
ferent sectors; b) it is not possible to reliably identify specific 
accounts more prone to EM, c) evaluation of the aggregates al-
lows to better deal with the effects of specific events (as regu-
lation). The first models known for identification of EM through 
discretionary accruals (accrual total – accruals non-discretion-
ary) are DeAngelo (1986) and Healy (1985), which might explain 
the prominence of positivist theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) 
during this period. However, it was in the 90s that EM studies 
of with this approach proliferated, highlighting the models pro-
posed by Jones (1991); Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), 
known as Jones (1991) modified; and Kang and Sivaramakrish-
nan (1995).
Since the proposition of these models, several stud-
ies have adopted them to identify EM practices and/or moti-
vational factors associated to them in, different countries or 
groups of countries, especially: (i) Jones (1991) model – e.g. 
Beneish (1997);  Erickson and Wang (1999); (ii) Jones modi-
fied model by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) – e.g. Mo-
nen (2003); Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca (2005); (iii) Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1995) model – e.g. Yoon and Miller (2002); 
and (iv) two or three of them compared – e.g. McNichols (2000); 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). Several also the proposed 
modifications to these models, mostly with the inclusion of vari-
ables in the model originally proposed by Jones (1991) and mod-
ified by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995).
Despite the differences in conceptual premises, variables 
and statistical treatment, in these models, the discretionary ac-272
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cruals (and therefore EM evidence) are not subject to direct ob-
servation and, therefore, are estimated by regressions. In these 
regressions, the discretionary accruals are the portion “unex-
plained” (error) of total accruals. In its abundant replication in 
subsequent studies, several changes were proposed in these 
models, especially with regard to “purify” the portion associated 
with discretionary accruals with the inclusion of control variables.
To test the hypotheses of our study, we developed mod-
els based on Jones (1991) modified model proposed by Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), with adjustments to include the ex-
planatory variables of crisis (in the interest of research) and con-
trol variables. A detailed analysis of models and their changes 
are made in sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.
Economic crisis proxies – explanatory 
variables of interest
In the scope of economic science, we can say that the theme ‘eco-
nomic crisis’ is closely linked to the existence of economic cycles. 
These cycles were determined originally by the fluctuating pro-
duction levels of a given economy over time. The literature that 
is currently designated for business cycles goes back to very re-
mote periods in the literature of economics. A seminal work in 
this area is due to Mitchell (1927) who observed the fluctuations 
of the U.S. economy. Other economists like Kuznets (1926) and 
Schumpeter (1982) also dedicated themselves to understand the 
oscillation movements of production levels. Currently, as shown 
by Banerji and Dua (2011), consideration should be given to a 
set of macroeconomic variables in order to identify the formation 
of economic cycles and not just the production level as a way to 
identify variations in aggregate economic activity.
The most widely used definition of business cycles dates 
back to the seminal work of Mitchell. According to Burns and 
Mitchell (1946):
Business cycles are a type of fluctuation found in 
the aggregate economic activity of nations that 
organize their work mainly in business enterpris-
es: a cycle consists of expansions occurring at 
about the same time in many economic activities, 
followed by similarly general recessions, contrac-
tions and revivals that merge into the expansion 
phase of the next cycle; this sequence of changes 
is recurrent but not periodic.
This definition has been widely used since then. Even more 
contemporary definitions – like that of Lucas Jr. (1977), which de-
fined the economic cycle as deviations of aggregate real product 
from its tendency – are similar to the original vision. In this con-
text, one can consider that periods of crisis would be the times of 
recession of product level generated in a given economy. The de-
termination of these periods considers, therefore, empirical eval-
uation criteria, basically analysis of time series, in which the fluc-
tuations are observed but, this assessment is not trivial.
In the evaluations made for Brazil, there were long peri-
ods where there is a product growth. This movement occurred 
primarily to the mid-70s of last century. In contrast, the two final 
decades of the century show a reversal of this cycle. They are pe-
riods when the national product has short cycles of growth fol-
lowed by larger cycles of decline. Chauvet (2002) adopted NBER 
(National Bureau of Economic Research) definition of recessions 
that correspond to general reductions in various economic sec-
tors lasting at least 6 months, in order to avoid the influence of 
short-term events.
According to Chauvet (2002), between 1997 and 1999, 
there were moments of descent in the Brazilian business cycle. 
In 2001 and 2003 there was also a decrease of activity in Brazil 
(Chauvet & Morais, 2010). Thus, for the purposes intended here, 
these were identified as years of crisis in the Brazilian economy.
Since studies mentioned in this section do not consider 
the year 2008 in their research, this was not initially marked ini-
tially as a year of crisis. However, due to the extent of the crisis 
around the world, we decided to consider it a crisis year.
Accordingly to our hypotheses, the explanatory variables 
of interest are the crisis variables, defined as dummy. The vari-
able CRISESI denotes a dummy variable which equals 1 for years 
defined as a crisis (1997-1999, 2001, 2003 and 2008), and 0 for 
non-crisis years (2000, 2002, 2004-2007 and 2009).
As explained in introduction (section 1), since 2003 pres-
ents some different characteristics from the other ‘crisis pe-
riods’, we constructed another scenario, replacing 2003 for 
2002, which is justified by the strong economic turbulence in 
a pre-election period. This second scenario demanded anoth-
er crisis variable: CRISESII which equals 1 for years defined as 
a crisis (1997-1999, 2001, 2002 and 2008), and 0 for non-crisis 
years (2000, 2003, 2004-2007 and 2009).
Control explanatory variables
In addition to the explanatory variables of interest, we used con-
trol variables associated with changes in discretionary accruals 
pointed in previous studies. Specifically, we included the com-
pany sector (SECTOR) according to the classification of Econom-
atica® database (19 sectors). This variable was used to control 
differences in levels of accruals due to the regulatory environ-
ment (Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Johl, Jubb, & Hougton, 
2003; Han, Kang, Salter, & Yoo, 2010).273
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Previous studies (Othman & Zeghal, 2006; Stubben, 
2010; Han, Kang Salter, & Yoo, 2010) also suggested that large 
firms tend to exercise less discretion in accounting results, due 
to stronger monitoring by the stock market. Thus, the natural 
logarithm of total assets (divided by one billion) in the current 
year was used as a control variable for firm size (SIZE). This pro-
cedure allowed the variable to be used with the same scale of 
measurement of model variables.
Other studies pointed out that measures of discretionary 
accruals are misspecified for firms with extreme levels of perfor-
mance (e.g. Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; McNichols, 2000; 
Larcker & Richardson, 2004; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005). 
We used the term return on assets (ROA) to control firm perfor-
mance. This variable was obtained by the database Economati-
ca® and represent the ratio of the net income over total assets, 
following the recommended by McNichols (2000), Kothari, Le-
one, and Wasley (2005), and Jones, Krishnan, and Melendrez 
(2008). Furthermore, according to McNichols (2000), Larcker 
and Richardson (2004), Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006) and 
Othman and Zeghal (2006), companies presenting growth in their 
operations, tend to have large values of accruals. So, the market-
to-book (MTB) variable, calculated by the market capitalization at 
the end of the fiscal year divided by the book value of common 
equity and obtained at the database Economatica®, was chosen 
as a proxy for growth opportunity of the company’s operations.
We also included the leverage as a control variable, ob-
tained as the ratio of loans and financing over total assets. 
The leverage variable was used in logarithmic scale (denoted 
by LEV) in order to linearize its relation with the accruals. It is 
appropriate to include this variable in the models because the 
leverage of the company might encourage managers to manip-
ulate earnings, for example, to prevent the violation of debt 
covenants (e.g. Sweeney, 1994; Dichev & Skinner, 2002) or to 
maintain/raise a good credit rating in order to achieve more fa-
vourable conditions from creditors (e.g. Charitou, Lambertides, 
& Trigeorgis, 2007; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1994). How-
ever, the presence of creditors could be important for inhibiting 
opportunistic behaviour of managers, as noted Jensen (1986). 
Thus, some studies have found a tendency for earnings man-
agement practices in firms with low levels of leverage (Dechow 
& Skinner, 2000; Jelinek, 2007).
Finally, a control variable for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) was inserted to address, at least partially, the firms’ de-
pendence of foreign funding and, consequently, their exposure 
to the economic crises, accordingly to their origin (external or 
internal) and extent. Moreover, as observed in previous studies 
(e.g. Nobes, 1998; Zarzeski, 1996), the sources of financing can 
affect the accounting practices.
Earnings management models
The models most commonly used in earnings management pre-
vious studies (as mentioned in section 3.1.1) are based on mea-
sures of aggregate total accruals, where discretionary accruals 
are used as a proxy for EM (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, & Swee-
ney, 1995; McNichols, 2000).
In our estimated models, the dependent variables used 
were the total accruals (TA) in the current period deflated by to-
tal assets in the previous period (A). Total accruals were calculat-
ed as the difference between the change in current assets and the 
change in cash and cash equivalents, less the difference between 
the change in current liabilities and the variation in provision for 
IRPJ and CSLL (both income taxes to which Brazilian companies 
are subject), less depreciation and amortization. So, we use as 
explanatory variables in developing the total accruals model the 
following variables: a) the inverse of the total assets (INVAT); b) 
the difference between the change in gross revenues and the 
change in accounts receivable (ΔREVC) and; c) fixed assets (PPE).
In this study, we adjusted Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 
(1995) EM model, also known as Jones modified model, includ-
ing more partitioning variables such as proposed in previous 
studies (e.g. McNichols, 2000; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; 
Han, Kang, Salter, & Yoo, 2010; Choi, Kim, & Lee, 2011), in or-
der to make it more robust for testing the research hypotheses. 
Thus, to study the effect of crises in discretionary accruals, we 
use this adjusted model through two distinct approaches, here 
referred to: (i) two-step (partitioning variables), first estimat-
ing discretionary accruals (earnings management) controlled by 
performance (ROA) and then testing its relation with crisis vari-
able and the remaining control variables; (ii) one-step, using an 
unique model to estimate discretionary accruals including both 
crisis variable and the control variables.
Two-step approach
The model used in the first approach (two-step) considered the 
decomposition of total accruals (TA) in non-discretionary accru-
als (NDAC) and discretionary accruals (DAC) as:
                                
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
= 𝗽𝗽0+𝗽𝗽 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽3
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                       (1) 274
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Where TAit represents total accruals of firm i in year t, de-
flated by total assets in year t – 1;  represents the total assets 
of firm i in year t – 1, and INVAT, ΔREVCit, PPEit and ROAit , repre-
sent, respectively, for firm i in year t, the inverse of total assets, 
the difference between the change in gross revenues and the 
change in accounts receivable (ΔREVit – ΔRECit), the fixed assets 
and the return on assets (ROA, as a proxy for the control vari-
able, firm performance).
Using the  model (1), the discretionary accruals (DACit) 
are estimated by residuals , where they are the difference be-
tween total accruals and the estimated mean of non-discretion-
ary accruals (NDACit). In this case, the effect crisis variable in 
discretionary accruals is estimated by the regression between 
discretionary accruals DACit and the crisis variables (CRISESI e 
CRISESII), previously defined in section 3.1.2; considering the 
assumption of control variables, i.e.,
This approach is commonly adopted in earnings management studies (e.g. Defond & Subramanyam, 1998; McNichols, 2000; 
Lacker & Richardson, 2004; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; Othman and Zeghal, 2006; Han, Kang, Salter, & Yoo, 2010).
One-step approach
The model used in the second approach (one-step) considered that the effect of crisis variables on discretionary accruals can 
be directly estimated by the relation between total accruals and crisis variables (e.g. Han & Wang, 1998). Thus, when the control 
variables were added, the regression model was given by:
            
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
= 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽3
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽5𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽6𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽7𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝗽𝗽8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝗽𝗽𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
27
𝑗𝑗=9
+ 𝗽𝗽28𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.                                                                    (3) 
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽3𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽4𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝗽𝗽𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
23
𝑗𝑗=5
+ 𝗽𝗽24𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.      (2) 
In model (3), we added control variables MTB, SIZE, LEV, 
FDI and SECTOR – which represent, respectively, market-to-
book, company size, leverage, foreign direct investment and 
sector of business activity – to previous total accruals model 
(1). Therefore, the hypotheses of difference in discretionary ac-
cruals due to the occurrence of crisis can be tested by the inclu-
sion of crisis variables (CRISESI and CRISESII) previously defined 
in section 3.1.2. The effect of crisis variable can be estimated by 
the coefficient  β28 associated with the variable CRISESit.
The models (1 and 2) and (3) were estimated using the re-
gression methodology for panel data, according to Wooldridge 
(2002) and Othman and Zeghal (2006).
Sample selection and data
In order to evaluate and validate the research hypotheses, we 
considered a sample of 445 companies listed on Brazilian stock 
exchange – BM&FBOVESPA during the period 1997 to 2009, 
which consisted initially of a panel with 3,941 firm-years obser-
vations in the study period (13 years).
Companies’ data, i.e. all the variables required for the 
construction of empirical models of aggregate accruals, beyond 
the control variables described in section 3.1.2, were extracted 
from Economatica® database.
From the initial sample, we excluded companies: i) that 
did not have data on at least four years in the series; ii) with 
missing data for depreciation and amortization, assets and lia-
bilities, due to their impact on aggregate accruals measure; iii) 
with missing data for fixed assets PPE. To mitigate the effects of 
outliers in the sample, we winsorized the variables: total accru-
als (TA), INVAT, DREVC, PPE, ROA, MTB and LEV, using percen-
tiles of 0.5% and 99.5%. The final sample consisted of the un-
balanced panel, therefore of 3,772 of firm-years observations.
RESULTS
In this section we present the results of data analysis. Initially, 
we conducted a descriptive analysis to show the behaviour of 
the variables used in the models. Then the results of the regres-275
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sion models with panel data (unbalanced data) used to evaluate the hypotheses of discretionary accruals in periods of crisis are pre-
sented. Finally, we perform inferences with discretionary accruals estimates based on models (1) and (2), described in section 3.2, 
to assess how they behave in relation to crisis variables.
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of total accruals (TA) for the total sample and by crisis variables (CRISESI and CRISESII). Re-
sults indicate an average value of -0.0509 for total accruals besides a high variability (0.1938). It is noticed that total accruals aver-
ages by crisis variables are lower in periods of crisis when compared to non-crisis periods. The t test indicates that, statistically, the 
TA average in periods of crisis is lower than the TA average in non-crisis periods (p-value <0.01) when considering both crisis vari-
ables (CRISESI and CRISESII).
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics of total accruals, explanatory and control variables.
Variables Crisis indicator Company-year Mean Standard Deviation t test p-value
TA - 3,941 -0.0509 0.1938 -
ΔREVC - 3,935 0.0985 0.2911 -
PPE - 3,943 0.4027 0.2808 -
ROA - 3,922 -1.7790 22.2860 -
MTB - 3,935 1.5893 3.7301 -
SIZE - 3,941 -0.1950 2.0044 -
LEV - 3,828 -1.1588 0.7353 -
FDI - 2,941 0.0258 0.0082 -
TA by CRISESI 0 (No) 2,201 -0.0420 0.1992 3.450
1 (Yes) 1,740 -0.0630 0.1861 0.001†
TA by CRISESII 0 (No) 2,191 -0.0383 0.1973 4.620
1 (Yes) 1,750 -0.0670 0.1881 0.000†
Levels of significance:  ‘ ** ‘  10%    ‘ * ‘  5%   ‘ † ‘  1%.
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix between variables – which will be used in models (1) and (2) – based on the Spear-
man correlation (a measure of non-parametric correlation does not imply the existence of linear relationship between the variables 
under study). Correlations indicate that the total accruals (TA) are positively correlated with ROA and MTB, and negatively with IN-
VAT, PPE and LEV.276
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TABLE 2. Spearman correlation matrix between models’ variables.
Variables TA INVAT DREVC PPE ROA MTB SIZE LEV
INVAT
-0.030
*0.059
-
ΔREVC
0.002
0.923
-0.010
0.528
-
PPE
-0.222
†0.000
-0.074
†0.000
0.161
†0.000
-
ROA
0.261
†0.000
-0.228
†0.000
0.211
†0.000
-0.093
†0.000
-
MTB
0.047
†0.003
-0.348
†0,000
0.138
†0.000
-0.065
†0.000
0.331
†0.000
-
SIZE
0.022
0.172
-0.988
†0.000
0.051
†0.002
0.094
†0.000
0.248
†0.000
0.367
†0.000
LEV
-0.216
†0.000
-0.128
†0.000
-0.038
*0.0190
-0.333
†0.000
-0.305
†0.000
-0.060
†0.001
-0.135
†0.000
FDI
-0.009
0.579
-0.044
†0.005
-0.029
0.073
-0.023
0.143
0.045
†0.005
0.113
†0.000
0.056
†0.000
-0.063
†0.000
Levels of significance:    ‘ * ‘  5%   ‘ † ‘  1%.
Results of regression
The models in section 3.2 were developed under the regression approach (longitudinal) for panel data, according to Wooldridge 
(2002). The models were adjusted using the R® software (version 2.13). In order to adjust the models we used the methodology of 
models with random effects for two reasons: a) the test results of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (Wooldridge, 2002), which 
indicated the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (therefore, the use of panel regression technique is appropriate), b) the exis-
tence and inclusion of control variables that do not vary over time (SECTOR).
Initially, we developed the model described in (1) according to the so-called two-step approach here. The results are presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3. Panel data regression with random effects for TA.
Model – Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) extended model:
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
= 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽3
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Variables Coefficient standard error t value p-value
Constant 0.0091 0.0063 1.4481 0.1477
INVAT -345.6200 291.7400 -1.1847 0.2362
ΔREVC -0.0340 0.0159 -2.1304 0.0332 *
PPE -0.1230 0.0144 -8.5627 < 0.0000 †
ROA 0.0026 0.0006 3.4281 < 0.0000 †
N = 3,772 R² adjust. =  0.1095
F-statistic 115.9850 < 0.0000 †
Levels of significance:  ‘ ** ‘  10%    ‘ * ‘  5%   ‘ † ‘  1%.277
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The results exposed in Table 3 corroborate those found in 
literature, since the variables, ΔREVC e PPE showed statistical 
significance. In addition, the ROA variable was highly significant 
(p-value <0.01), like McNichols (2000) and Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley (2005). Inclusion of the variable ROA strongly altered 
the coefficients of the variables INVAT (-345.6200 and 291.7400) 
and DREVC (-0.0340 and 0.0159) when compared with the coef-
ficients of the model obtained from Dechow, Sloan, and Swee-
ney (1995) model – INVAT (-992.2000 and 326.0700) and ΔREVC 
(-0.0146 and 0.0173). In addition, the adjusted R2 of the model 
was equal to 10.95%, compared to the adjusted R2 of 4.05% ob-
tained from Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) model, indicat-
ing the relevance of variable ROA to control the effect of the per-
formance of companies in the discretionary accruals.
The effect of crisis in accruals was tested by adjusting the 
models (1) and (2), described in section 3.2. After adjusting the 
model (1), Table 3, the discretionary accruals (DACit) were ob-
tained for each firm-year. Thus, the effect of crisis variables in 
discretionary accruals was estimated by the regression between 
discretionary accruals (DACit) and the crisis variables (CRISESI 
and CRISESII) previously defined in section 3.1.2, considering 
the existence of control variables.
Table 4 presents the results of the adjustment in the re-
gression model with panel data (random effects) for the discre-
tionary accruals, where MTB, SIZE, LEV, FDI and SECTOR were 
considered as control variables. Table 5 presents the results of 
fitting the model (2), where besides the inclusion of ROA con-
trol variable, we added MTB, SIZE, LEV, FDI and SECTOR. Thus, 
the hypothesis of difference in discretionary accruals due to the 
occurrence of crises has been tested by the inclusion of crisis 
variables (CRISESI and CRISESII) directly in the regression of to-
tal accruals.
TABLE 4.  Regressions of discretionary accruals DAC, estimated by two-step approach with crisis variables 
(CRISESI and CRISESII).
Panel A: 
 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽3𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽4𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝗽𝗽𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
23
𝑗𝑗=5 + 𝗽𝗽24𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Variables Coefficient standard error t value p-value
Constant -0.0125 0.0108 -1.1645 0.2443
MTB 0.0019 0.0008 2.4412 0.0147 *
SIZE -0.0038 0.0019 -2.0617 0.0393 *
LEV -0.0607 0.0090 -6.7473 <0.0000 †
FDI -0.9544 0.3064 -3.1146 0.0019 †
†SECTOR - - - 0.0003 †
CRISESI -0.0102 0.0053 -1.9204 0.0549 **
N = 3,772 R² adjust. =  0.0778
F-statistic 13.2654 0.0000 †
(continue)278
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TABLE 4.  Regressions of discretionary accruals DAC, estimated by two-step approach with crisis variables 
(CRISESI and CRISESII).
Panel B: 
 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽3𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽4𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝗽𝗽𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
23
𝑗𝑗=5 + 𝗽𝗽24𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Variables Coefficient standard error t value p-value
Constant -0.0131 0.0106 -1.2397 0.2152
MTB 0.0018 0.0008 2.3297 0.0199 *
SIZE -0.0039 0.0019 -2.1251 0.0336 *
LEV -0.0608 0.0090 -6.7442 <0.0000 †
FDI -0,8489 0.3128 -2.7138 0.0067 †
†SECTOR - - - 0.0002 †
CRISESII -0.0139 0.0054 -2.5767 0.0100 †
N = 3,772 R² adjust. =  0.0786
F-statistic 13.4087 < 0.0000 †
Levels of significance:  ‘ ** ‘  10%    ‘ * ‘  5%   ‘ † ‘  1%.
† Variable SECTOR (19 sectors) significance was evaluated by a sequential F-test.
TABLE 5.  Regressions of total accruals (TA) with crisis variables (CRISESI and CRISESII) and control variables using 
the one-step approach.
Panel A:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
= 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽3
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽5𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽6𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
                                  𝗽𝗽7𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  ∑ 𝗽𝗽𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
27
𝑗𝑗=9 + 𝗽𝗽28𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Variables Coefficient standard error t value p-value
Constant -0.0183 0.0125 -1.4636 0.1434
INVAT -334.9900 330.2100 -1.0145 0.3104
ΔREVC -0.0187 0.0154 -1.2114 0.2258
PPE -0.1325 0.0191 -6.9510 < 0.0000 †
ROA 0.0016 0.0005 3.2361 0.0012 †
MTB 0.0020 0.0007 2.6633 0.0078 †
SIZE -0.0021 0.0026 -0.8090 0.4186
LEV -0.0842 0.0118 -7.1668 < 0.0000 †
FDI -0.9886 0.3018 -3.2758 0.0011 †
†SECTOR - - - 0.0129 *
CRISESI -0.0120 0.0053 -2.2527 0.0243 *
N = 3,772 R² adjust. =  0.1970
F-statistic 33.1131 < 0.0000 †
(conclusion)
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TABLE 5.  Regressions of total accruals (TA) with crisis variables (CRISESI and CRISESII) and control variables 
using the one-step approach.
Panel B:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
= 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽3
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽5𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽6𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
                                  𝗽𝗽7𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  ∑ 𝗽𝗽𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
27
𝑗𝑗=9 + 𝗽𝗽28𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Variables Coefficient standard error t value p-value
Constant -0.0189 0.0124 -1.5301 0.1261
INVAT -342.4300 329.2900 -1.0399 0.2985
ΔREVC -0.0191 0.0153 -1.2426 0.2141
PPE -0.1311 0.0189 -6.9135 < 0.0000 †
ROA 0.0015 0.0005 3.2112 0.0013 †
MTB 0.0019 0.0007 2.5346 0.0113 *
SIZE -0.0023 0.0026 -0.8971 0.3697
LEV -0.0844 0.0118 -7.1842 < 0.0000 †
FDI -0.8570 0.3109 -2.7565 0.0059 †
†SECTOR - - - 0.0091 †
CRISESII -0.0169 0.0056 -3.0317 0.0024 †
N = 3,772 R² adjust. =  0.1979
F-statistic 34.3054 < 0.0000 **
Levels of significance:  ‘ ** ‘  10%    ‘ * ‘  5%   ‘ † ‘  1%.
† Variable SECTOR (19 sectors) significance was evaluated by a sequential F-test.
The results presented in Tables 4 and 5 indicate the differ-
ence in discretionary accruals in periods of crisis and non-crisis. 
Some previous studies (e.g., Othman & Zeghal, 2006) revealed 
that variables ROA, MTB, SIZE, LEV and SECTOR were statistical-
ly significant. In our study, the control variables ROA, MTB, LEV, 
FDI and SECTOR were also statistically significant, which did not 
occur with the SIZE in the model using the one-step approach. 
The statistical significance of the SECTOR variable was tested 
using a sequential F-test, where the interest was to evaluate 
changes in accruals behaviour across different sectors (Econo-
maticaÒ sectors classification was used).
Regarding the significance of the control variables, the 
variable ROA showed positive signal indicating that firms with 
extreme performance tend to manage more their results (in line 
with McNichols, 2000; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005). The 
positive sign of the variable MTB indicates that companies with 
higher growth expectations tend to manage more results (in ac-
cordance with Othman & Zeghal, 2006; Arnedo, Lizarraga, & 
Sánchez, 2007). The negative sign of LEV observed in the mod-
els indicates that companies with higher leverage tend to man-
age less their results, as noticed before by Dechow and Skin-
ner (2000), Jelinek (2007) and Han, Kang, Salter, & Yoo (2010). 
As noted in Nobes (1998) and Zarzeski (1996), the sources of fi-
nancing can affect the accounting practices. In our study, this 
relationship indicated that companies with greater reliance on 
foreign investment are less likely to manage their results.
Finally, the results showed in Table 4 indicated that large 
firms (variable SIZE) tend to exercise less discretion in accounting 
results as observed in Othman and Zeghal (2006), Stubben (2010) 
and Han, Kang, Salter, & Yoo (2010). However, this result was not 
observed in Table 5 (one-step approach). This is due to the fact that 
in the first approach (two-step), the statistical significance of crisis 
variables and control variables were assessed by the regression of 
discretionary accruals DACit, (unobservable), which might have in-
troduced a bias to the results of the models in Table 4.
Table 4 show the statistical significance of the variables 
of crisis (CRISESI significant at 10% and CRISESII significant at 
1%). The crisis scenario defined by the variable CRISESII report-
ed higher discretionary accruals than CRISESI. Still considering 
the results of the models presented in Table 4, we observe an 
adjustment of the models (Panel A and B) with adjusted R2 equal 
to 7.78% and 7.86% respectively.
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In Table 5, the statistical significance of crisis variables 
was assessed directly in the models of total accruals (one-step 
approach) using a panel data regression of total accruals as a 
function of crisis variables, considering the control variables 
ROA, MTB, SIZE, LEV, FDI and SECTOR. The models presented, 
respectively, adjusted R2 equal to 19.70% and 19.76%. Results 
obtained by the models (Panel A and B) when using this ap-
proach are identical to the models presented in Table 4 (two-
step approach), when we analyze the statistical significance of 
crisis variables.
In summary, the significance of the crisis variable in the 
models indicates that, as expected on the basis of the literature 
review conducted, this is a motivating factor for EM practices 
could aim either to reduce or increase the earnings. In the first 
case, such a practice might be used, for example, to “dump” 
poor results from prior periods or even to avoid government 
sanctions (e.g. withdrawal of subsidies), covering a higher than 
expected performance. In the second, such a practice could be 
adopted especially to bring “good news”, retaining or attracting 
fearful investors.
The estimated models (two-step and one-step approach) 
did not fulfil the basic assumptions imposed by a statistical 
technique of regression (homogeneity and normality of errors), 
which requires precaution in the results analyzed. However, the 
results obtained in all models showed stable coefficients and 
statistical significance for all control variables (with the excep-
tion of the SIZE variable in the model using one-step approach), 
which is consistent with previous studies.
Inference on discretionary accruals
To complete the studies on the behaviour of accruals in relation 
to crisis variables, inferences were made about the discretion-
ary accruals DACit (unobservable) estimated by: (i) the Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) model with extension (McNichols, 
2000; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; Han, Kang, Salter & Yoo, 
2010), using the two-step approach and; (ii) the model (2) – 
one-step approach (both described in section 3.2).
In each of these models, as shown in Table 6, discretion-
ary accruals DACit were estimated without the presence of crisis 
variables. Then a t test was conducted to evaluate the difference 
in discretionary accruals for periods of crisis and non-crisis.
The results in Table 6 indicate that, regardless of the ap-
proach (and model) used, there is a change in discretionary 
accrual behaviour when we consider the periods of crisis and 
non-crisis, i.e., the average discretionary accruals in periods of 
crisis is statistically different from the average in non-crisis pe-
riods. We also observed that the significance is greater in the 
model corresponding to Panel A, when discretionary accruals 
were estimated with no regard to firm performance (control vari-
able ROA). When the effect of control variables ROA and ROA, 
MTB, SIZE, LEV, FDI and SECTOR was considered, respective-
ly, in models of Panels B and C, we assume that we are getting 
“more pure” discretionary accruals, which could alter the sta-
tistical significance of crisis variables of crisis, i.e., the discre-
tionary accrual behaviour when we analyze according to the pe-
riods of crisis.
In fact, this effect occurs, but without compromising the statistical significance of crisis variables. Again, we observed a 
greater significance when using the crisis scenario CRISESII.
TABLE 6. Inference in discretionary accruals according to the variables of crises.
Variables Crisis Indicator Company-year Mean Standard Deviation t test and  (p-value)
Panel A – Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney model (1995):
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
= 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽3
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
CRISESI 0 (No) 2,104  0.0076 0.1684 3.060
1 (Yes) 1,668 -0.0089 0.1623 0.002†
CRISESII 0 (No) 2,095  0.0108 0.1692 4.380
1 (Yes) 1,677 -0.0128 0.1609 0.000†
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TABLE 6. Inference in discretionary accruals according to the variables of crises.
Variables Crisis Indicator Company-year Mean Standard Deviation t test and  (p-value)
Panel B – Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) extended model:
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
= 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽3
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
CRISESI 0 (No) 2,104  0.0052 0.1665      2.170
1 (Yes) 1,668 -0.0064 0.1592      0.030*
CRISESII 0 (No) 2,095  0.0074 0.1681      3.110
1 (Yes) 1,677 -0.0091 0.1568      0.002†
Panel C: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
= 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽3
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
+ 𝗽𝗽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽5𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
                  
                                𝗽𝗽6𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽7𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝗽𝗽𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
27
𝑗𝑗=9 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
CRISESI 0 (No) 2,104  0.0051 0.1610      2.240
1 (Yes) 1,668 -0.0062 0.1483      0.025*
CRISESII 0 (No) 2,095  0.0070 0.1623      3.070
1 (Yes) 1,677 -0.0085 0.1464      0.002†
Levels of significance:  ‘ ** ‘  10%    ‘ * ‘  5%   ‘ † ‘  1%.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our purpose was to verify if during economic crises listed, com-
panies in Brazilian stock exchange tended to adopt earnings 
management practices. To achieve our goal, a 3,772 firm-years 
observation sample was selected from 1997 to 2009 and tested 
with regression models, different approaches (one and two-step 
statistical tests) and two diverse scenarios for crises (consider-
ing the theory of business cycles).
After a descriptive analysis to observe variable be-
haviour, we ran the regression analysis using both the two-step 
approach – estimating discretionary accruals (EM proxy) con-
trolled by performance (ROA) before testing its relation with cri-
sis variable and the remaining control variables and the one-
step approach – an unique model including discretionary 
accruals, both the crisis variable and the control variables – for 
the two crises scenarios (CRISESI and CRISESII) in order to test 
the proposed hypotheses – i.e. there is a statistically significant 
difference in discretionary accruals (used as proxies for earn-
ings management behaviour) of companies listed in the Brazil-
ian stock exchange in periods of economic crisis in relation to 
non-crisis periods.
The results obtained revealed that crisis variables were 
significant in accruals models developed. Furthermore statis-
tical tests on discretionary accruals identified statistically sig-
nificant differences between the means comparing crisis and 
non-crisis periods, despite the models tested (two-step and 
one-step approaches) for estimating these accruals. These dif-
ferences were observed in both planned scenarios. For the first 
scenario, crisis definition was based strictly on economic con-
cepts of business cycles theory. On the second scenario, an eco-
nomic environment of instability in Brazil was also considered 
due to the 2002 political process. Thus, it is appropriate to in-
fer that managers’ behaviour changed during economic crises 
periods. Explanations for such changes were not covered by our 
models.
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Although, as mentioned before, the inherent subjectivi-
ty implied in earnings management concept and the limitations 
of using discretionary accruals as proxy (e.g. they cannot be ob-
served directly) alert us to be cautious about the implications of 
our results and it can be said, at least, that regulators should be 
more alert to managers’ manipulations on accounting numbers 
during crises. In this sense, our study can be useful for inves-
tors and creditors. This is particularly relevant for capital mar-
kets that presented rapidly growth in the past ten years and are 
trying to gain domestic and foreigner investors’ confidence. This 
is the case of Brazil, our focus, but it can also be applied in oth-
er markets, either emerging or developed.
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